Sentencing Issues: A Summary by Ring, Peter Smith et al.
Scholarworks@UA — UAA Justice Center 
February 1977 
Sentencing Issues: A Summary 
Peter Smith Ring, ed. 
Suggested citation 
Ring, Peter Smith (ed.). (1977). Sentencing Issues: A Summary. Report prepared for the Alaska Legislature. 
Anchorage, AK: Criminal Justice Center, University of Alaska Anchorage. 
Summary 
This report contains three summaries prepared as an introduction for members of the Alaska 
Legislature to criminal sentencing issues: (1) A paper on presumptive sentencing reviews the study 
"Fair and Certain Punishment: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal 
Sentencing" (McGraw-Hill, 1976), and presents a guide for legislative action prior to the enactment of a 
presumptive sentencing system. (2) A report on sentencing standards in Alaska presents excerpts from 
Alaska Supreme Court Justice Robert C. Erwin's article "Five Years of Sentence Review in Alaska" (5 
U.C.L.A. Law Review 1 (1975)). (3) A final paper, "An Introduction to Basic Sentencing Issues" – an 
edited version of a memorandum by Jerold Israel of University of Michigan Law School, discusses a 
series of proposals that acknowledged experts have advanced concerning the reform of the laws 
governing sentencing. 
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Introduction 
This summary contains three summaries each of which 
deal with sentencing in criminal cases. The first, dealing 
with presumptive sentencing, was written by the editor of 
this summary. The second focuses on past sentencing prac­
tices in Alaska from the view of an Associate Justice of 
the State Supreme Court, while the third looks at the 
overall picture in sentencing from a national perspective. 
These summaries are designed to provide members of 
the Legislature with a reasonably comprehensive but brief 
introduction to issues attendant to sentencing so that 
they may be better equipped to deal with legislative 
proposals on the subject which will be before them in this 
session. 
The Criminal Justice Center's staff is prepared to 
respond in greater detail to specific inquiries from indi­
vidual members of the House or Senate. 
REPORT ON PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING 
Several members of the Criminal Code Revision Commission, 
at its January meeting in Juneau, asked for more information 
on the concept of presumptive sentencingo Staff has reviewed 
Fair and Certain Punishment*, the study which, in 1976, 
introduced the concept of presumptive sentencing to a wider 
audience. 
In very brief terms, Fair and Certain Punishment is a 
significant contribution to the literature on sentencing. It 
is worthy of the most serious consideration by all Cornrniss1on 
members, legislators, criminal justice practitioners and · 
concerned members of the public. It presents an excellent 
picture of current sentencing practices across the country and 
of the serious problems associated with those practices. 
The Task Force deals quite fairly with these problems 
and presents a brief but extremely thorough discussion of,a 
number of proposed alternatives to current sentencing practices -
including mandatory minimums - all of which it found to be 
less than satisfactory. 
Because of the special concern of the Commission on the 
matter of mandatory minimums, the comments of the Task Force 
on that subject are quoted here in full: 
*Report of the Twentieth Century Fund, Task Force on Criminal
Sentencing. McGraw Hill, (1976). Because of an embargo on
substantial ·quotation from the report prior to its April 13,
1976 release date, staff was unable to provide this report
in a more timely fashion.
"Flat-time sentencing goes too far in eliminating 
all flexibility. By requiring every single defendant 
convicted under the same statute to serve the identical 
sentence, it threatens to create a system so automatic 
that it may operate in practice like a poorly programmed 
robot. This is especially true if statutory definitions 
of crime remain as broad and inclusive as they are today. 
These same objections apply substantially to manda­
tory minimum sentences for most crimes. We agree that 
there are certain extremely serious crimes for which 
imprisonment should be required without regard to the 
circumstances. (Our own recommendations make provision 
for such imprisonment. ) But we reject the concept of 
the mandatory minimum as a general approach to sentencing. 
Moreover, we have concluded that a mandatory minimum 
sentencing structure, even if it were desirable, only 
addresses a small part of the critical problem of dis­
parity and extremes in sentencing. It deals only with 
minimum sentences - not with the major injustices at 
the high end of the range. 
It is our considered view that some degree of 
flexibility must be maintained both at the sentencing 
and the parole stage in cider for the system to be just 
and effective. We have also concluded that discretion 
cannot be significantly reduced or controlled without 
thoroughgoing legislative (or legislatively authorized) 
redefinition and subcategorization of current crimes."* 
The Task Force went on to recommend its own solution to 
the problem - presumptive sentencing. This system would 
require substantial code revision (at least for sentencing 
purposes) which would allow criminal conduct to be divided into 
a large number of categories depending upon the circumstances of the 
crime. This significantly greater particularization·of criminal 
conduct would make it unnecessary to give a judge as much latitude in 
* Id. , pp. 17, 18. (Emphasis in the original.)
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sentencing since the legislature would have anticipated 
many of the variations which go into leniency or severity 
in sentencing through its codification efforts. 
The present discr�tion of judges and parole boards would 
be guided by a presumptive sentence for each established 
criminal circumstance, the type of crime having been refined 
by the introduction of a large number of degrees within each 
crime. The court would justify departure from that presumptive 
sentence through a calculus of certain designated mitigating 
or aggravating circumstances. A similar calculus would be 
used for second or subsequent offenders. 
To implement the system the Task Force recommended: 
"For each subcategory of crime, we propose that 
the legislature, or a body it designates, adopt a 
presumptive sentence that should generally be imposed 
on typical first offenders who have committed the 
crime in the typical fashion."* 
* * * 
"The Task Force recommends that the legislature, 
or a body it designates, also define specific aggra-
vating or mitigating factors again based on frequently 
recurring characteristics of the crime and the crimin�l. "** 
* * *
"The Task Force believes that sentencing hearings 
should be mandatory to establish any aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances and to have the sentence 
pronounced. "*** 
* * *
"We recommend that the legislature establish a 
commission composed of representatives of the judiciary 
*Id. , p. 20.
**Id., p. 20. 
***Id., p. 21. 
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and other interested groups to undertake the drafting, 
establishment, and periodic review of a presumptive 
sentencing system. "* 
* * *
"We recommend that there should be periodic 
review of crime categories; of minimum, maximum, and 
presumptive sentences; and of mitigating and aggravating 
factors."** 
* * *
"We recommend that more imaginative approaches 
be taken to sentencing by imposing punishment that 
mitigates the crime breeding effects of today's prisons."***· 
* * *
"We recommend the elimination of most current 
barriers to employment of ex-convicts."**** 
* * * 
"We urge that, in general, presumptive sentences 
be accompanied by a considerable reduction in the 
lengths of sentences authorized by legislatures, 
imposed by courts, and served by prisoners. It is 
also our recommendation that a larger number of 
criminal defendants - principally those convicted 
of serious crimes - should serve some time in prison."***** 
Each of these recommendations was accompanied by detailed 
commentary which outlined the Task Force's rationales and what 
they believed would be accomplished in a positive fashion by 
implementation. Their commentary touched on substantialJ.¥ all 
I 
of the issues which the Criminal Code Revision Commission has 
considered in its discussions relating to substantive code 
revision of terms of sentence and factors related to sentencing. 
The Task Force then presented an illustrative presumptive 
*Id., pp. 25, 26.
**Id., p. 28. 
***Id., p. 28. 
****Id., p. 29. 
*****Id., p. 32 
4.
sentencing sentencing statute for armed robbe�y, and a further 
list of illustrative crimes and presumptive sentences. They 
took great pain to point out that these were illustrations 
of the system and not recommendations supported by the entire 
Task Force. 
The report concluded with an excellent background paper 
by Professor Alan M. Dershowitz of the Harvard Law School. 
This paper deals with a variety of issues related to sentencing 
and treats all of them in a comprehensive yet easily read and 
understood fashion. 
As is made clear by the recommendations of the Task Force ,.
legislative enactment of a presumptive sentencing system for 
Alaska would require a great deal more research and analytical 
work beyong that provided by the Task Force's recommendations. 
It is of considerable significance to the Alaska Commission that 
such a system does not require a legislative basis. It could 
be implemented through the judicial power without specific 
legislative sanction, a course deserving careful consideration 
by its avoidance of adding further complexity to the work of 
code revision. 
The Study justified non-legislative implementation as 
follows: 
"Except for fhe proposed curtailment of the 
power of parole boards and prison administrators, 
federal, state, and local court systems need not 
wait for legislative action to establish a system 
of presumptive sentences. Courts are administra­
tive agencies in fact if not design; as Professor 
5.
Kenneth Culp Davis notes, 'Earlier and more dili­
gent use of agencies' rule-making power is a far 
more promising means of confining excessive 
discretionary power than urging legislative bodies 
to enact more meaningful standards.' Since 
'power to make rules always accompanies discretionary 
power and need not be separately converred,' 
presumptive sentences for·each crime, as well as 
the weights to be attached to prior convictions 
and to mitigating and aggravating circumstances, 
can be promulgated by courts in the form of 
, administrative.rules and guidelines. (See Kenneth 
Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice [Baton Rouge, 
La. : Louisiana State University Press, 1969], 
ch. 3, esp. pp. 56, 68.)"* 
Thus, at least two avenues are open to arriving at 
implementation of a presumptive sentencing system. Of 
the two, the latter - court promulgated administrative rules 
and guidelines - presents a number of advantages over legis­
lative enactment. 
It provides the ability to experiment on the utility of 
presumptive sentencing in connection with a limited number 
of crimes without encountering the difficulties inherent in 
drafting, introducing and gaining passage of new legislation. 
Moreover, if the system develops unforeseen problems it can 
be revised or abandoned altogether in a much easier fashion 
than is required for statutory enactments. 
Taking the Task Force's recommendations as a guide for 
legislative action, the following work would be required before 
a presumptive sentencing system could be enacted. 
1) Substantive crimes would have to be broken down
*Id. , p. 20. (The language is contained in a comment to
the text by Mr. Charles Silberman, a New York author and
member of the Task Force.)
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into subcategories which reflected degrees of severity o In 
part, we are engaged in this process already in our Code 
revision work. It should be noted, however, that the 
Commission has been resistant to a large number of subcatego­
rizations and that, though a high degree of subdivisions may 
be useful to sentencing, it may well pose problems for the 
prosecution. 
2) Terms of sentence for each subcategory of crime
would have to be established for the presumptive sentence 
and a formula developed for dealing with repeaters and aggra­
vating and mitigating circumstances. 
These terms and their accompanying formulae could be 
developed through the process of group discussion and 
legislative compromise. Or, they could be arrived at by· 
the process of research. Given the significance of the end 
product to the administration of justice, the latter seems 
to be the preferred course of action. 
An a priori sentencing model could be constructed by 
random sampling of all cases involving the crime in question 
over a period of time to determine what Alaska's judges have 
given the average first time offender convicted for that 
crime. A similar process would be used for second, third, etc. · 
offenders. The results of this research would provide "real" 
sentencing parameters within which questions related to 
presumptive sentences could be addressed. This re�earch would 
7.
tend to indicate why the Task Force calls for a continuing process 
of review. Changes in community attitude and social conditions 
have a good deal to do with actual sentencing practices. 
3) The same research is required on issues of mitigation
and aggravation. Exhaustive "lauridry" lists could be developed 
based on the experience of practitioner recollections, or case 
files could be surveyed to develop real lists of typical 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances which recur with some 
frequency in Alaska's environment. 
The research involved in items (2) and (3), above 1 would 
require considerable time and effort, but it �ay be essential in 
a system where fairness is to be first subject to mechanical 
screening. 
8.
SENTENCING STANDARDS IN ALASKA 
(NOTE: The material which follows has been excerpted from an 
article written by Supreme Court Justice Robert c. Erwin [entitled: 
"Five Years of Sentence Revie,;., in Alaska"], which appeared in 
5 U.C�L.A.-Alaska L. Rev. l {1975). ) 
The Supreme Court has defined four overreaching goals of sen-
tence review: 
"(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in 
length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the protection of the., 
public interest; 
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender
by affording him 'an opportunity to assert grievances
he may have regarding his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of
the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of
the sentencing process; and
(iv) to promote the developillent and application of cri­
teria fo� sentencing which are both rational and just.
In. addition, the court specified objectives which inhere 
in the Alaska Constitution's mandate that "[p]enal administra­
tion shall be based on the principle of reformation and upon 
the need for protecting the. public": 
Within the ambit of this constitutional phraseology are 
found the objectives of re�abilitation of the offender into a · 
·non-criminal member of society, isolation of the offender from 
so"ciety to prevent criminal conduct during the period of con- . 
: finement, deterrence of the offender himself after his release -
·from confinement or other penological treatment, as well as
deterrence to other members of the community who might possess
tendencies toward criminal conduct si..rnilar to that of the of­
fender, ·and community condemnation of the individual offender;
or in other words, reaffirrnation of societal norms for the pur­
pose of maintaining respect for the norms themselves .• 11 1 
After reviewing a number of sentence appeal cases involving
homicides and other crimes against people, Justice Erwin notes: 
"These cases suggest that in the court's view the �iolent 
criminal conduct which causes injury to an innocent victim 
1 Erwin, "Five Years of Sentence Review, " 5 U.C.L.A.-Alaska L. Rev. 
1,2 (1975); citing State v. Chaney, 477 P2d 441 {Alaska 1970). 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
should be dealt with firmly, and that _the protection of 
and the affirmation of societal norms should be primary 
1or sentencing in this area. Such a view was confirmed 






Tpis court has previously expressed the view
that violent crimes involving physical injury to in­
nocent people are to be regarded as our most_serio�s
of fens es and are not to _be treated lightly. • • • II
Justice Erwin then addressed sentencing of drug offenders. He· .. 
noted that in Waters v. · State3 the Supreme Court, for purposes. of_· 
analysis, divided drug offenses into four degrees. of culpability. 
"l . .  Smuggling or sale of large quantities of nar­
cotics of possession of large quantities for -sale. 
2. Smuggling or sale of small quantities of nar­
cotics or possession of small. quaJ1tities for sale ..
3. Possession of narcotics without intent to sell.
4e Marijuana offenses. 
The court reminded the trial courts that these categories 
are i.uportant factors in the detennination of the sentence: 
We think these categories are relevant in sen­
tencing of drug offenders.· From the record it seems 
that-appellant is neither a titan of the narcotics 
business nor a mere useri he seems to be -an occasional 
retailer. In sentencing it should be remembered that 
the maximum sentence for a particular offense expres­
ses a legislative judgment about how the worst offender 
within a class designated by the legislature.should 
be treated. Here there is an absence of foundation 
for characterization of
4
the appellant as the_worst
type of drug of fender. rr . • . 
Continuing his review of sentencing drug offenders, Justice 




"The Waters case may be read as standing for three.basic 
propositions. First, in a drug case, it·�s appropriate for the 
court on revie1.-1 to undertake a somewhat thorough canvass of the 
background, age, and particular circumstances of the defendant; 
Erwin, su:era. at 7, (footnotes omitted}. 
483 P2d 199 (Alaska 1971). 
Erwin, suera. at 89, (footnote or-;1itted}.
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these considerations loom larger than ·in the areas of violent 
crime discussed above. · Secondly� incarceration for a substan­
tial period for a single violation will geneially be inappro­
priate, unless the offender falls squarely \•Tithin the worst 
category, e.g., a large-scale wholesaler. Finally, a course of 
drug related criminal conduct, as evidenced by other convictions, 
may aggravate the seriousness of the drug charge itself.us 
Crimes involving property were also considered by Justice. 
Erwi�. With respect to this group he made the following obser-
vations: 
"A substantial.number of sentence appeal cases have arisen
in the area of crimes involving property. These are roughly 
divisible for purposes of analysis into crimes of stealth,·such 
as burglary, larceny or forgery, and crimes in which weapons 
are employed, such as robbery and perhaps arson • .  
A review of these cases indicates that age, background, and 
previous criminal history play a more significant part in deter­
mining the proper sentence than in those cases in which physical 
injury to the victim is involved. In this area the court has 
referred to the standards of the American Bar Association, in 
stating the sentences in excess of five years should be rest�i -
ted to those cases clearly �ppropriate by virtue of background.116 
* * *
nRobbery involves somewhat.different considerations, given 
· its higher potential for injury. The court has affirmed sub­
stantial sentences where violence has �ctually occurred or where
life has been endangered, or· where prior co"nvictions indicate
that "less stern measures have proven unsuccessful.� Nonethe­
less, the opinions evidence a willingness to take a hard look at
the age, background and psychiatric profile of the individual
offender, and it cannot be said that the court considers the
possibility of sentence relief to be automatically foreclosed in
the robbery area. However, it would appear appropriate to take
into consideration the potential injury to the victim in ·arriv­
ing at a proper sentence. Certainly, the use of weapons aggra-:- - _
vates the nature of the crime. 117 
Before concluding his review of sentence appeals Justice Erwin
dealt with one other class of offenders worthy of some attention: 




"One further special sentenci�g problem, which has bee� 
mentioned in other sections but ·which may deserve scrutiny in 
pp. 9, 10. 
p. 12 (footnote omitted).
p. 13 (footnote omitted}.
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isolation, is that of the repeated offender. · In a number of 
per curiam opinions the court summarily approved long-term sen­
tences for recidivists, evidencing a recognition that the in­
cidence of repeated offenses greatly enhances the likelihood 
of continued antisocial behavior and the concomitant need to 
protect society therefrom. "8 
Justice Erwin 's concluding remarks merit serious consideration 
and are presented hereafter in toto: 
0 Given the small number of sentences reversed as excessive 
over the past five years, can it be said that sentence appeals 
in Alaska have been a waste of time for the court or an exercise 
in futility for defendants? The answer must surely be no.· 
. A brief 3;eview of the expectations enunciated in Chaney pro'- , :. -
vides a standard by whj,.ch to judge success or failure. · ·
· 
"At the heart of sentence appeal is a qeveloped commitment 
to justice for the offender, and thus the correction of an 
excessive sentence in a particular case. A re-reading of those 
cases in which relief has been granted 'leaves one with a sense. 
that the Alaska Supreme Court was on solid ground, and confirms 
that a dispassionate appellate perspective is required. Perhaps 
some cases have been presented without sufficiently thoughtful 
examination of the defendant's background, his value to our 
society or the presence of mitigating circumstances (or at least 
without_ sufficient articulation of those factors); the supreme 
court, like all courts, must tak� care that classifications 
devise� to s�inulate thought do not curtail it. On . the other 
hand, it must ba remembered that, as a practical matter, the 
trial court is the principal repository of justice in a criminal. 
case. The "clearly �istaken" standard assures that �f the 
supreme court.errs, it will err in favor of the trial court's 
discretion. Given the inherent limitations of appellate review, 
. no other course is feasible.
"The other side of the coin of justice to the offender is 
justice to the community. Three times the court has disappro­
ved lenient sentences, expressing a sense of outrage toward the 
gratuitous violence shown by the record • .  Hany tiraes. it has 
affirmed lengthy sentences which reflect the trial judge's will­
ingness to be severe if necessary • . Early criticisms that judi­cial initiative would be stifled and that judges leery of 
reversal would seek the apparent safety of middle range sen­
tences, have not come true. Thus it does not appear· that the 
community has been ill-served by sentence appeal due to half-­
hearted vindications of societal norms. 
"Finally, has sentence appeal promoted development of 
rational, just and humane sentencing criteria? The supreme 
court seems to have made progress in this area. Arguably some 
standards such as the rule against consideration of police 
"contactsn or unverified allegations, or the need for psychi­
atric data, could have been proillulgated absent the se�tence 
8 Id, p. 18.
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appeal legislation� Other doctrines - the notion that only 
hardcore defendants should be visited with maximum sentences, 
the adoption of the ABA 1 s five year sentence guideline, the 
expression of the need for firmness to counter violence - clearly 
derive from the sentence review authority vested in the court 
by the legislature, and might not otherwise have been promul­
gated. 
"Whether the rules developed in the cases are wise i� a 
matter for individual judgment. In any event, the job of de­
visi..7.g rational standards is far from complete, and will never 
ba finished as long as corr�unity standards· and perceptions 
continue to evolve. But the need for a central arbiter of those 
values in criminal cases, within the sentencing parameters set 
by the legislature, has been convincingly demonstrated. The 
cases show that manifest unfairness has led to reversal in a 
few cases; the appearance of unfai�ness has been alleviated 
in others; and, hopefully, unfairness has been prevented in 
numerous cases due to the guidance afforded by the Alaska 
Supreme Court's sentence appeal decisions."9 
·A  cursory review of c;ses involving,sent�n�e appeais heard by
the Supreme Court since Justice Erwin.' s article appeared revealed 
no significant departures from the standards .enunciated in the 
article • . 
A compa.!'.'ison of the sentencing sta!1dards and guidelines estab-. 
lished by the Alaska Supreme Court in the· course of its sentence 
reviews with factors considered to be either aggravating or mitiga-:­
ting in riature under a presumptive sentencing scheme suggests a · .  · 
considerable amount of similarity. Thus, the legislature may wish 
to consider sentencing criteria set forth in Alaska case law should 
it decide to pursue a presumptive sentencing bill. 
9 Id, pp. 20, 21. 
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NOTE: This is a heavily edited version of a memorandum 
written by Professor Jerold Israel of the University 
of Michigan Law School. Professor Israel has given 
permission to reproduce the memorandum. The editing 
was done by the Staff of the Criminal Justice Center 
and was designed t.o reduce the num_ber of references 
to the various studies which were included in the 
original. In addition, apoendices contained in the 
original have been omitted� 
AN INTRODUCTION TO B.ASIC SENTENCI:l'lG ISSUES 
This memorandum discusses a series of pro9osals, advanced 
by generally acknowledged "experts," concerning the reform 
of the laws governing sentencing. Among the proposals 
considered are those advanced by the following groups, 
whose titles are too long to bear repeating in full through­
out the text: American Bar Association (A.B.A. Standards), 
the National Council on Crime an<l Delinquency (Model 
Sentencing Act), the American Law Institute (Model Penal 
Code), the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice (President's Commission), 
the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals (N.A.C. ), the National Commission on 
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Paper Report by 
Peter Lrnv (Low Study) , and the Tt,ventieth Century Fund: Task 
Force Reoort on Criminal Sentencing (20th Century). The 
memorandum is devoted to proposals relating to the use and 
allocation of sentencing authority rat�er than to procedure 
utilized in exercising that authority. 
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LIMITED GRADES OF CRIMES 
First, it is recommended that the range of available 
sentences be reduced to several set categories, typically 
classified by letter (e.g., class A felony, class B f�lony, 
class C felony, etc.). The advantages of this approach, 
adopted in all of the recent codes modeled after the Model 
Penal Code, are noted in the Low Study: 
There is a consensus among recent Code Reform 
efforts that the best way to avoid inconsistencies 
of penalty structure . • •  is to systematize the 
sentencing provisions in a separate part of the 
Code by the use of sentencing categories which are 
intended to represent the entire spectrum of punish­
ment that is to be available for crine. Such an 
ap9roach has the effect of creating an internally 
consistent, carefully thought-out penalty structure 
which not only will assist the rationalization of 
penalties provided for presently existing offenses, 
but which also will help to assure that new offenses 
can be integrated into the existing structure in a 
manner consistent with what is already on the 
books. . . • 
EMPHASIS UPON ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISON�•1ENT 
Another generally accepted recommendation is that the 
emphasis in sentencing should be upon alternatives to impris­
onment. That is, fines and community based treatnents, 
like probation, where reasonably applicable, should be 
preferred to imprisonment. In suonort of restricting the 
use of imprisonments , Professor Norval Morris , in The Future 
of Imprisonment , stresses that ''parsimony in t�e use of 
imprisonment" follows from the basic moral and utilitarian 
functions of imprisonment: 
The least restrictive -- least punitive -­
sanction nece�sary to achieve define� social purposes 
should be chosen • • • . [Accordingly , ]  a presumption 
in favor of punishment less severe than imprisonment 
pervades all recent scholarship and most legislative 
reforms . This principle is utilitarian and humani­
tarian; its j ustification is somewhat obvious since 
any punitive suffering beyond societal need is , in 
this context , what defines cruelty . . . • The drafts­
men of the American Law Institute ' s  Model Penal Code 
sought to capture this :principle of parsimony in 
imprisonment in the phraseology of that code ' s  main 
article on sentencing. Section 7.01 is entitled 
' Criteria for Nithholding Sentence of Imprison-
ment • • .  ' and the section directs the court to 
order other punishments unless ' i�orisonment is 
necessary for protection of the public . '  
MANDATORY IMPRISON�1ENT 
Some experts argue that guidelines, such as those 
suggested by the Model Penal Code or Professor Morris , are 
inadequate becaus e they still permit too much j udicial leeway. 
What is needed , they argue, is greater certainty of imprison­
ment for serious crimes . The best approach here, they argue , 
is requiring imprisonment for certain crimes . In some instances, 
-3-
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the proposals do not require that the imprisonment be for 
any S?ecified term beyond the minimum sentence that is 
administratively feasible in a particular j urisdiction 
(ordinarily one year). In other propoials, it is suggested 
that there should be a mandatory minimum of a specified 
period (e . g . , 2 ,  3 ,  or 4 years) . This ap9roach was recently 
supported by President Ford in his crime message: 
Impriso'nrnent too seldom follows conviction for 
a felony. In the 1960's crime rates went higher , 
but the number of criminals in prison , state and 
federal ,  actually went down . * * * There should be 
no doubt in the minds of those who commit violent 
crimes -- especially crimes involving harm to 
others -- that they wil l  be sent to prison if 
convicted under legal processes that are fair , 
prompt and certain . 
Consider also the fol lowing comments of Professor James 
Q .  Wilson in Thinking About Crime: 
[ O] ne way of defining a good sentence is to
say it is that disposition that minimizes the chance 
of a given offender's repeating his crime. Under 
that definition , we would not only expect but want 
disparities in sentences -- one armed robber getting 
five years in prison and another getting 9robation -­
provided only that we had good reason �o believe 
that each sentence was appropriate to each criminal's 
prospects for rehabilitation. On the other hand , if 
we believe that a good sentence is one �hich deters 
others from committing a crime , then we might wish 
to impose the same penalty on ?ersons with very 
different orosoects for rehabilitation, and to make 
that penaliy s�fficiently severe to discourage 
potential criminals, _ especial ly those who believe 
they might be regarded as good bets for rehabili­
tative -- which is to say, lenient -- treatment . 
- 5-
Compare, however, the following comments in mandatory 
minimums in the Low Study : 
Two related arguments are ty?ically advanced 
in support of legislatively mandated sentences. 
The first is that a mandatory sentence is necessary 
in some instances to assure that the courts will 
not deal too leniently with a particular offender o 
The second is that the certainty of substantial 
punishment for the violation of a particular 
statute will act as a significant deterrent to the 
commission of that offense. 
Neither argument, however, is persuasive. In 
the first place, there is clear evidence as a 
practical matter that the system does not function 
· as .the arguments would envisage. As is explored in
part I of this memorandum, there is not certainty
of punishment for Federal narcotics offenders
[ notice the stan<ling mandatory sentences] ,  nor rtre
the courts prevented from dealing leniently with an
offender if that is their desire .
There are affirmative disadvantages to such
sentences as well. In some instances, a mandatory
sentence results, as a practical matter, in a
vesting of sentencing authority in the invisible
and uncontrollable discretion of the prosecutor,
perhaps the least desirable place for such
authority to repose . There are always alternative
offenses which could be charged . .
Opponents of mandatory sentencing provisions have raised, 
in addition to the arguments noted in the Low Study, the 
question as to whether the "taxpayers [ r ] eally are willing to 
bear the momentary costs of a mandatory sentencing program?" 
It is noted that the prisons currently are almost at capacity, 
and considerable costs would be entailed in building new 
prisons . It has been suggested that the public must b e  
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wil ling to commit "substantial additional resources for 
prisons , courts and prosecutors -- in many states perhaps 
even doubling or tripling the capacity of the criminal 
j ustice system [or such ] sentencing reforms ( mandatory 
• ti minimums) wil l  be a disaster , if not a J oke. (Wall Street
Journal, 624 ,  1976. )
DETERMINING THE LENGTH OF SEUTENCE : 
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE 
The Nature of Indeterminate Sentencing 
Prison sentences for felony offenses typically are of 
the "indeterminate" variety. That is , there is a significant 
gap between the maximum sentence that may be served and the 
minimum that must be served. Thus , a person wil l be sentenced 
to imprisonment for a term of from one-to-five or three-to­
ten years. Even life sentences often are indeterminate 
because state law will provide that a "lifer" may be paroled 
after serving a specified sentence (e.g. , 10 years). 
does not apply to "mandatory life sentences," usually 
reserved for homicide . )  
(This
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The maximum sentence that may be imposed always is 
established by statute. In some j urisdictions, the j udge may 
set an outer-limit for the indeterminate sentence that is 
less than that allowed by statute. In others, the maximum 
set by statute appli�s as the outer-limit in all cases. 
Those favoring automatic application for the statutory 
maximum in all cases argue that there is no way a j udge can 
be certain in advance that the progress of the prisoner will 
j ustify his release at an earlier point. than the maximum 
authorized by law. Those favoring granting the judge discre­
tion to reduce the maximum argue that the j udge may find that 
the crime committed, under the facts of the case, does not 
j ustify the full range of the sentence considered by the 
legislature, which must set the maximum with the most serious 
variety of the particular crime in mind. 
Ordiz:iarily, minimum sentences are not prescribed by law 
but left to the j udge ' s  discretion -- except that the minimum 
cannot be so close to the maximum as to eliminate the concept 
of indeterminancy . Thus, typically the minimum is limited by 
law to no more than 1/ 3 or 1/2 of the maximum. Some j udges 
frown upon imposing minimums in any case except a special 
situation where a "warning to others" is needed . These j udges 
ordinarily will impose the lowest sentence that is administra­
tively feasible (e . g . ,  1 year) as the minimum sentence. Others 
frequently impose a minimum that is close to the maximum 
�ercentage permitted by law . 
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OBJECTIONS TO INDETER�INATE SENTENCING 
Disparity 
A major obj ection to current indeterminate sentencing 
is that it grants the court far too much discretion , even 
if one accents the value of a certain degree of indeter� 
minancy . Consider, for example, a situation where the 
statute sets a maximum of 10 years and the court has the 
authority to reduce the maximum by half in the individual 
case and to set a minimum up to 1/2 of the maximum given 
in the case . One defendant convicted of the offense may be 
sentenced to 5-10 years , while the other may receive 1- 5 
years. Moreover , even where the maximum imposed must be 
that set by statute, and the discretionary minimum is 
limited to 1/3 of the maximum, there is a substantial dif­
ference , it is argued , between a sentence of 1 to 10 years 
and 3 1/3 to 10 years . While parole releases ordinarily 
coming in the range of two years where the board is not 
restricted by a lengthier minimum, the second defendant may 
serve almost bvice as long as the first . 
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LENGTH OF SENTENCE 
Some persons, though acceptin9 the concept of indeter­
minate sentences generally argued that the quest for 
indeterminancy does not justify the high maximum sentences 
authorized under ty9ical American statutes. They argue 
that maximum terms should be limited to a shorter pe�iod, 
perhaps five years, with longer terms provided only for 
especially dangerous offenders through extended term 
sentencing provisions. The rationale supporting this pro­
posal is noted in the N . A  .C. report , which recommends tha.t 
"state penal code revisions should include a provision that 
the · maximum sentence for any of fender not specifically found 
to represent a substantial danger to others should not 
exceed five years for felonies other than murder." The s tudy 
report notes : 
It is well-documented and almost universally 
recognized that the sentences imposed in the United 
States are the highest in the western world. This 
results from a number of factors including the high 
maximum sentences authorized by statutory provisions. 
To be assured that the very dangerous offender is 
incapacitated, legislatures in effect have increased 
the �ossible maximum sentence for all offenders. 
This- dragnet approach often results in i:r.1position 
of a high maximum sentence on persons for whom it 
is patently excessive . The wide flexibility exacer­
bat�s the �isparities in sentencing that se�iously 
handicap correctional programs. 
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The President' s Commission . • •  reported in 
1967 that more than one-half of all persons 
confined in state prisons in 1960 had been sentenced 
to maximum terms of at least ten years. But of 
those released in that year the average length of 
time actually served in confinement was less than 
two years, and only 8. 7% had actually served five 
years or more. 11 Lowering the authorized maximum 
term will not unduly restrict the court' s discre­
tion as it affects the length of time actually 
served in prisons. It will, however, reduce the 
excessively long sentences served by some offenders 
for whom such sentences are inappropriate . It also 
will diminish disparate treatment of similarly 
situated offenders . 
[Professbr Israel concluded his discu�sion of 
basic sentencing issues with a discussion of 9re­
sumptive sentencing . Because a separate memorandum 
from the Center has addressed that issue , it has 
been omitted herein . ]  
11 A s'ubsequent study, showing sentence and actual time 
served by first releases from state correctional institu­
iions in 1970, was consistent . Thus, in most of the 
j urisdictions examihed , more than 50% of the persons 
sentenced received terms in excess of 5 years, w ith over 
90% actually serving less than 5 years. In Tennessee, 
for exam9le, 6 2 %  were sentenced to terms of 5 years 
or less, 20% to terms of 10 years or less and 18% to 
terms in excess of 10 years . Actual time spent was 
less than 5 years for 90% , less than 10 years for an 
additional 8 1/2 % ,  and more than 10 years for only 
1 1/2 % . Only one of the j urisdictions cited in the 
study had more than 5%  serving in excess of 10 years. 
